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ABSTRACT 
Prior research has found a) recovery from overshadowing as a result of posttraining 
extinction of comparator stimuli (i.e., the overshadowing stimulus), and b) context 
modulation of conditioned responding to Pavlovian stimuli (i.e., renewal). The 
present research brought together these two findings by investigating whether comparator 
stimuli are subject to contextual control. In a Pavlovian conditioned suppression 
situation, rats were exposed to an overshadowing procedure (i.e., AX1) in one 
context and then received extinction of the overshadowing cue (i.e., A2) in the same 
or a different context. If AX1 training and subsequent extinction of A occurred in 
the same context, animals exhibited recovery of responding to the target cue (i.e., 
X) regardless of the test context. However, if AX1 training and extinction of A 
occurred in different contexts, behavior depended on the test context. If X was tested 
in the overshadowing context, overshadowing was observed. But if X was tested 
in the context where A had been extinguished or in a third (neutral) context, overshadowing 
was not observed. Thus, context modulates comparator effects in a manner 
somewhat similar to how it modulates simple Pavlovian responding. The notable 
exception was that robust responding to both A and X was observed in the neutral 
context, which is problematic for most contemporary theories of learning. 
  
The comparator hypothesis (Miller & Schachtman, 1985; also see Miller & 
Matzel, 1988) is a response rule for Pavlovian responding. The hypothesis 
assumes that during training the unconditioned stimulus (US) becomes asso- 
ciated with the target conditioned stimulus (CS) and with other cues (hereafter 
referred to as comparator stimuli) present during training of the target CS. 
More precisely, comparator cues are defined as any cues that were present in 
close temporal (and spatial) proximity to the target CS during training (i.e., 
background cues and simultaneously presented, punctate CSs). Moreover, 
an association between the CS and its comparator stimulus is formed during 
training. At the time of testing, the CS is presumed to activate one representation 
of the US, which we call the ‘direct’ representation, as a result of the 
CS-US association, and a second representation of the US, which we call 
the ‘indirect’ representation, as a conjoint result of the CS-comparator stimulus 
and comparator stimulus-US associations. According to the comparator 
hypothesis, excitatory conditioned responding to the target CS is a direct 
function of the activation of the direct US representation and an inverse function 
of the activation of the indirect US representation. 
 
Thus, in the framework of the comparator hypothesis, behavior at test is 
expected to reflect the strength of the direct CS-US association relative to 
the strength of the CS-comparator association(s) and the comparator stimuli- 
US association(s). As a result, any treatment conducted after training that 
will serve to weaken either the CS-comparator association or the comparator 
stimuli-US association should strengthen responding to the target CS at test. 
Consistent with this expectation, posttraining extinction of a CS’s comparator 
stimulus has been found to strengthen excitatory responding and weaken 
inhibitory responding. For example, Kaufman and Bolles (1981) and Matzel, 
Schachtman, and Miller (1985) performed an overshadowing experiment in 
which the overshadowing stimulus (A) was extinguished following overshadowing 
treatment (AX+, with X representing the overshadowed stimulus 
and + representing the US). Those animals displayed robust responding to 
X (i.e., recovery from overshadowing). Thus, the overshadowing effect was 
attenuated without further CS-US training. 
 
Recovery from overshadowing without further X+ training is problematic 
for most theories which posit that overshadowing is due to a failure to acquire 
an association between X and the US (e.g., Kamin, 1969; Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972; but see Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994). Rather, it suggests, 
as does the comparator hypothesis, that animals associated X with the 
US during training, but failed to express this association at test. In the framework 
of the comparator hypothesis, A served as the primary comparator stimulus 
for X. Posttraining exposure to the comparator stimulus alone resulted 
in extinction of the comparator stimulus-US association (and perhaps the 
CS-comparator association) in the Kaufman and Bolles (1981) and Matzel 
et al. (1985) studies, thereby facilitating expression of the X-US association. 
Other researchers have also reported data that, although not easily integratable 
into the framework of the comparator hypothesis, are consistent 
with its expression-failure view of overshadowing. For instance, Kasprow, 
Cacheiro, Balaz, and Miller (1982) demonstrated recovery from overshadow- 
ing as a result of exposing subjects to a ‘‘reminder’’ treatment (e.g., a few 
presentations of the overshadowed CS outside of the original training context). 
Additionally, Kraemer, Lariviere, and Spear (1988) found spontaneous 
recovery from overshadowing when a long retention interval was imposed 
between training and testing. 
 
We were interested in looking for analogies between the factors that control 
responding to conditioned stimuli and those that govern the comparator 
role of a stimulus. Finding or failing to find analogies between the response 
eliciting and comparator roles of a stimulus might better inform us about 
the nature of the comparator process. For example, consider the phenomenon 
of ‘‘renewal.’’ Bouton and King (1983) demonstrated the importance of the 
context in modulating Pavlovian responding. They found that excitatory responding 
was restored (or ‘‘renewal’’) following excitatory conditioning of 
a CS in Context 1 and subsequent extinction of that CS in Context 2, if the 
subject was returned to Context 1 for testing. Fiori, Barnet, and Miller (1994) 
found a similar result with Pavlovian conditioned inhibition. Specifically, 
animals were given Pavlovian conditioned inhibition training (i.e., A1/ 
AX2) in Context 1 followed by counterconditioning with the inhibitor (i.e., 
X1, the analogue of extinction with respect to conditioned inhibition) in 
Context 1 or Context 2. If the inhibitor was counterconditioned in the inhibition 
training context (i.e., Context 1), inhibitory control was not witnessed 
when the inhibitor was later assessed in a summation test in either that context 
or in a neutral alternate context. However, if the inhibitor was counterconditioned 
in Context 2, conditioned inhibition was observed on a summation 
test if testing occurred in Context 1, whereas conditioned excitation 
was observed if testing occurred in Context 2. Thus, contextual control over 
behavior (renewal) appears to have an important impact on both Pavlovian 
excitation and inhibition. 
 
Whereas Bouton and his colleagues have shown that responding to a conditioned 
stimulus can be modulated by the context, we wanted to determine 
if this would likewise be the case for the comparator role of a stimulus. Thus, 
the present research investigated whether the comparator value of a CS’s 
comparator stimulus would differ as a function of the context in which the 
CS is tested if the target CS and the comparator stimulus for that CS are 
trained in one context and then the comparator stimulus is extinguished in a 
second context. In the framework of the comparator hypothesis, a reciprocal 
relationship in conditioned responding to an overshadowed CS and its comparator 
stimulus (the overshadowing CS) ought obtain in each test context. 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Prior research (Kaufman & Bolles, 1981; Matzel et al., 1985) using an 
overshadowing paradigm had found that posttraining extinction of the overshadowing 
stimulus administered in the original training context produces 
a recovery of responding to the overshadowed stimulus when testing occurs 
in either the training context or a neutral context. Extrapolating from the 
renewal literature, we reasoned that if posttraining extinction of the overshadowing 
stimulus were conducted outside of the training context, such a 
recovery effect would not be seen if testing were conducted in the original 
overshadowing training context. But recovery would be observed if CS testing 
occurred in the context in which the comparator stimulus had been extinguished. 
Such a pattern of results would suggest that the modulatory (comparator) 
role of the comparator stimulus had been ‘‘renewed’’ for those 
subjects that received posttraining extinction of the overshadowing stimulus 
in the alternate context and were then tested in the original training context. 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, Experiment 1 was conducted in order to determine whether the comparator 
role of a stimulus (i.e., an overshadowing stimulus) is subject to 
contextual modulation (i.e., renewal) in a manner analogous to Pavlovian 
responding. Table 1 depicts the experimental design. Subjects in Groups O 
(Overshadowing), O-S (Overshadowing-Same), and O-D (Overshadowing- 
Different) received overshadowing conditioning (i.e., AX1) in Context M, 
while Group ACQ (Acquisition) received elemental conditioning of X and 
nonreinforced exposure to A (i.e., A2/X1) in Context M. Group O-S then 
received extinction of the overshadowing stimulus (i.e., A2) in the same 
context in which overshadowing conditioning had occurred (M), while 
Group O-D received extinction of the overshadowing stimulus in a different 
context (N). All subjects received equivalent exposure to both contexts during 
the extinction phase of the experiment. Animals were then tested on the 
target stimulus (i.e., X) in either of the two contexts (M or N). 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
 
The subjects were 72 experimentally naive, adult male and female rats of 
Sprague-Dawley descent. The animals were bred in our colony from Holtzman 
stock (Madison, WI). Weight ranges were 245–350 g for males and 
170–225 g for females. Each animal was randomly assigned to 1 of 4 groups 
counterbalanced for sex (Group ACQ, n = 12; O, n = 12; O-S, n = 24; 
O-D, n = 24). All animals were individually housed in stainless-steel wiremesh 
cages in a vivarium that was maintained on a 16-hr light/8-hr dark 
cycle. Experimental manipulations occurred within four hours of the midpoint 
of the light portion of the cycle. Purina Laboratory Chow was freely 
available in the home cages. One week prior to the start of the study, all 
subjects were progressively deprived of water. By Day 1 of the experiment, 
access to water in the home cage was limited to 10 min/day, occurring 18– 
22 hrs prior to any treatment scheduled for the following day. All subjects 
had been handled three times per week for 30 s, from the time of weaning 
until the initiation of the study. 
 
 
Apparatus 
 
Twenty-four experimental chambers were used. Each chamber measured 
30.5 cm x 27.5 cm x 27.3 cm (l x w x h). The chambers had clear Plexiglas 
side walls and ceilings, and metal front and back walls. The floor consisted 
of stainless steel rods. Chamber floors were 4-mm grids spaced 1.7 cm apart 
(center-to-center), connected through NE-2 neons, which allowed constant current 
Foot shock to be delivered by means of a high voltage AC circuit in 
series with a 1.0-MW resistor. The chambers could be dimly illuminated 
by a #1820 light bulb. The house light bulb was mounted on an inside wall 
approximately 14 cm from the center of the animal chamber. Background 
noise, mostly from a ventilation fan, was 74 dB(C) re.SPL. Each chamber 
was enclosed in a separate light- and sound-attenuating environmental isolation 
chest. 
 
Every chamber could be equipped with a water-filled lick tube that protruded 
1.5 cm into a cylindrical drinking recess at the bottom of one wall 
(axis perpendicular to the wall). Each recess was 5.5 cm in depth, 3.5 cm 
in diameter, and was set into a corner of its chamber, with its axis 6.5 cm 
above the chamber floor. An infrared photobeam was projected across the 
recess approximately 0.5 cm in front of the tip of the lick tube. In order to 
drink from the lick tube, subjects had to insert their heads into the recess, 
thereby breaking the photobeam. Time during which subjects accessed the 
lick tube could be recorded. Two 45-W speakers, mounted on interior walls 
of the environmental chest, could deliver a white noise stimulus of 6 dB 
(C) above background or a six per second train of clicks 10 dB (C) above 
background. These stimuli served as X and A, respectively. All CS presentations 
were 10 s in duration. The US was a 1-s, 0.7-mA footshock which was 
initiated at the termination of the CS. 
 
Treatment and testing occurred in one of two contexts which were designated 
as Context M and Context N. For each subject, Contexts M and N 
were different examples of the 24 chambers. Furthermore, Contexts M and 
N differed with respect to illumination of the chamber (houselight on or off ) 
and the presence or absence of an odor cue. The odor cue consisted of 
applying one drop of 100% methyl salicylate to a small, rectangular block 
of wood in each isolation chest. Contexts M and N were counterbalanced 
such that for half the subjects in each treatment condition, Context M consisted 
of houselight on and odor cue absent and Context N consisted of 
houselight off and odor cue present; while for the remaining subjects, this 
was reversed. 
 
Procedure 
 
Acclimation. Context acclimation was conducted on Days 1 and 2 without 
any CSs or USs programmed to occur. During each 60-min session, waterfilled 
lick tubes were available to all subjects. On Day 1, all subjects were 
acclimated to Context M, and on Day 2, all subjects were acclimated to 
Context N. 
 
Overshadowing training. Prior to training, all lick tubes were removed 
from the chambers. On Days 3 and 4, subjects from Groups O, O-S, and 
O-D received 4 compound stimulus presentations of AX immediately followed 
by the US, per day. Group ACQ received 4 nonreinforced presentations 
of A intermingled with 4 reinforced presentations of X per day (i.e., 
A2/X1). These conditioning sessions were conducted in Context M for all 
subjects and were 60 min in duration. 
 
Extinction. Prior to this phase, lick tubes were reinserted into each chamber. 
On Days 5, 7, 9, and 11, subjects from Group O-S received extinction 
of the overshadowing cue (i.e., A) in Context M (the overshadowing training 
context), while subjects from Groups ACQ, O, and O-D received exposure 
to Context M with no programmed stimulus presentations. On Days 6, 8, 
10, and 12, subjects from Group O-D received extinction of the overshadowing 
cue in Context N, while subjects from Groups ACQ, O, and O-S received 
exposure to Context N with no programmed stimulus presentations. During 
each extinction session, animals were exposed to 54 A- trials. All sessions 
were 135 min in duration. 
 
Testing. On Day 13, all subjects were tested on X in either Context M or 
N, thereby forming eight Training Group x Test Context conditions (i.e., 
ACQ.M, ACQ.N, O.M, O.N, O-S.M, O-S.N, O-D.M, and O-D.N). The test 
CS was presented after each subject had been placed in its test chamber and 
had completed 5 cumulative seconds of drinking (which for all subjects took 
less than 60 s). Thus, all subjects were drinking at the time of CS onset. Time 
to complete an additional 5 cumulative seconds of licking in the presence of 
the test CS were recorded with an imposed limit of 10 min. 
The data from one subject in Condition O.M was deleted from all analyses 
due to an equipment failure while this subject was being tested. 
Suppression times ordinarily yield distributions with a strong positive 
skew. In order to better approximate a normal distribution and thereby justify 
the use of parametric statistics, a log (base 10) transformation was performed 
on each suppression score. An alpha level of .05 was adopted for all tests 
of statistical significance. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Conditioned responding to X was observed to be greater in Group ACQ 
than Group O, indicating the basic overshadowing effect. Additionally, 
greater conditioned responding to X in Group O-S than Group O indicated 
that posttraining extinction of A in the overshadowing training context produced 
a recovery from the overshadowing response deficit. More importantly, 
a renewal effect for the comparator role of A was observed in Group 
O-D. Specifically, subjects in Group O-D exhibited behavior indicative of 
overshadowing when tested on X in the overshadowing training context, 
whereas they did not exhibit behavior indicative of overshadowing when 
tested on X in the context in which A (the overshadowing stimulus) had 
been extinguished, a result indicative of context specific control of the overshadowing 
response deficit. The following analyses support these findings. 
 
Times to complete an initial 5 cumulative seconds of drinking prior to CS 
onset on Day 13 were analyzed first. A 4 (Group: ACQ, O, O-S, or O-D) 
x 2 (Test Context: Context M or Context N) ANOVA failed to reveal main 
effects or interactions in the propensity to lick prior to the onset of the target 
CS, Fs < 1. This analysis indicates that the groups did not differ appreciably 
with respect to fear of the test context. 
 
A 4 (Group: ACQ, O, O-S, or O-D) x 2 (Test Context: Context M or 
Context N) ANOVA was conducted. Group means are illustrated in Figure 
1. A main effect of Group, F(3, 63) = 16.20, p < .01, and a Group X Test 
Context interaction, F(3, 63) = 5.46, p < .01, was observed. Planned comparisons 
were then conducted across test conditions within groups. These 
revealed no difference in responding to X between Test Conditions ACQ.M 
and ACQ.N, F(1, 63) < 1, O.M and O.N, F(1, 63) = 1.49, and O-S.M and 
O-S.N, F(1, 63) < 1, all ps > .10. But a difference was detected between 
Test Conditions O-D.M and O-D.N, F(1, 63) = 20.58. Specifically, greater 
responding to X by Group O-D was seen in Context N (where A had been 
extinguished) than in M (where overshadowing had occurred). Thus, these 
analyses found that for Groups ACQ, O, and O-S responding to X was not 
dependent on the context in which testing took place. However, for Group 
O-D responding to X was greater in Context N than in Context M, indicating 
that one or both of the test contexts had a modulatory effect on the behavior 
of this group. 
 
Due to the absence of significant differences between the pairs of test 
conditions corresponding to Groups ACQ, O, and O-S, data for these subjects 
was pooled across test contexts, that is, Test Conditions ACQ.M and ACQ.N 
were pooled to form Group ACQ, Test Conditions O.M and O.N were pooled 
to form Group O, and Test Conditions O-S.M and O-S.N were pooled to 
form Group O-S. Additional planned comparisons were conducted on these 
pooled means to assess the basic overshadowing deficit and recovery from 
this deficit. Evidence for overshadowing was supported by the greater responding 
in Group ACQ than in Group O, F(1, 63) = 30.89, p < .01. Recovery 
of responding to X as a result of posttraining extinction of A (without 
a context shift between training and extinction phases) was evidenced by 
greater responding in Group O-S than in Group O, F(1, 63) = 11.81, p < 
.01. Notably, only a few animals (3 out of 71) suppressed drinking for the 
maximum of 10 min. Consequently, our conclusions were not likely influenced 
by ceiling effects masking real differences in associative status. 
 
 
 
 
To further illuminate the performance of Group O-D, a 2 (Group: O-S or 
O-D) x 2 (Test Context: Context M or Context N) ANOVA was conducted. 
This revealed a main effect of Test Context, F(1, 43) = 5.62, p < .05, a 
main effect of Group, F(1, 43) = 12.03, p < .01, and a Test Context 3 
Group interaction, F(1, 43) = 12.16, p < .01. The results of this analysis 
indicate that the difference between Conditions O-D.N and O-D.M was 
greater than that between Conditions O-S.N and O-S.M. Thus, analogous 
with Pavlovian responding, renewal of the comparator role of A in attenuating 
responding to X was evidenced in Group O-D (i.e., subjects that received 
training of AX1 and extinction of A in different contexts). Subjects tested 
in Group O-D on X in the overshadowing training context (M) suppressed 
less than those tested on X in the extinction context (N) despite having received 
extinction of the comparator stimulus (i.e., the overshadowing stimulus) 
in an alternate context (N), F(1, 43) = 20.58, p < .01. This pattern of 
results was not observed in Group O-S (i.e., subjects that received training 
and extinction in the same context), in which responding to X was high 
regardless of the test location. The observed behavior of Group O-S is consistent 
with prior studies of target CS training and extinction of comparator 
stimuli in one context being followed by testing in a different context (e.g., 
Kasprow, Schachtman, & Miller, 1987). These studies found that testing in 
a neutral context does not affect this comparison. 
 
It is worth mentioning that this experiment does not address the issue of 
stimulus specificity. Based on the present data, it is possible that extinction 
of any excitatory stimulus (i.e., a stimulus other than A) could produce the 
same pattern of results witnessed in Experiment 1. However, in light of past 
research that concerned itself with the specificity of comparator effects, this 
is unlikely. Miller, Barnet, and Grahame (1992) found that in order to obtain 
recovery of responding to the overshadowed cue, posttraining extinction 
must be done with the same overshadowing cue as was used in training. In 
their study, overshadowing subjects received AX+ and BY+ with either 
subsequent extinction of both A and the training context, the training context 
alone, or no treatment. Results indicated that posttraining extinction of A 
resulted in recovery of responding to X but not to Y. These data demonstrate 
that the result of posttraining extinction of the A-US association was stimulus 
specific. Specificity of comparator cues has been found in a number of other 
conditioning preparations, including negative-contingency conditioned inhibition 
training, local context modulatory effects on excitatory conditioning 
(Miller et al., 1992), latent inhibition (Grahame, Barnet, Gunther, & 
Miller, 1994), and the relative validity effect (Cole, Barnet, & Miller, 1995). 
In each case, the posttraining extinction manipulation that resulted in the 
greatest recovery of responding was extinction of the specific comparator 
stimulus that was present during training of the target CS. 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the comparator role of an ambiguous stimulus 
is modulated by the contexts in which it was trained and extinguished. 
Dependent upon the location of testing, the comparator stimulus was either 
of high effective associative value (in the context in which overshadowing 
training had occurred) or of low effective associative value (in the context 
in which the comparator stimulus had been extinguished). Whether the comparator 
stimulus was of high or low effective value consequently determined 
responding to the target stimulus (X). 
 
Bouton and his colleagues (e.g., Bouton & Bolles, 1979; Bouton & 
Brooks, 1993; Swartzentruber & Bouton, 1992) have investigated a CS’s 
response eliciting potential in an associatively neutral context (Context 3) 
following simple Pavlovian training in Context 1 and extinction in Context 
2. Of critical interest in the present experiment is a CS’s modulatory (i.e., 
comparator) potential in an associatively neutral context (Context 3) following 
Pavlovian training in Context 1 and extinction in Context 2. There are 
at least four possibilities worthy of consideration: 1) The site in which ambiguity 
about a CS is established (i.e., the extinction context because during 
extinction the CS is for the first time paired with a second outcome, reinforcement 
having been the first outcome) may modulate behavior exclusively in 
that context, with all other contexts supporting the knowledge state existing 
prior to the establishment of ambiguity. In the case of renewal of excitation 
(i.e., excitation training with a CS in one context followed by extinction 
training with that CS in another context), this view would predict that behavior 
in the neutral context would resemble that seen in the first (training) 
context (i.e., vigorous conditioned responding). 2) The context where the 
US is presented may determine conditioned responding in a neutral context. 
That is, responding to the CS in the training context might generalize to all 
neutral contexts. In this case, the same prediction as above would prevail. 
One would expect to see responding similar to that seen in the first (training) 
context. 3) The behavior seen in a third, neutral context may represent an 
averaging of the two different values of X in the two treatment contexts. 
This alternative would predict conditioned responding somewhere between 
that seen in the first (training) and second (extinction) contexts. 4) The consequences 
of extinction might generalize to the neutral context by virtue of 
recency, which is equivalent to generalization (rather than context specificity) 
of what is learned in the context in which ambiguity arises (ambiguity 
is created not during initial conditioning, but during extinction). This leads 
to a prediction of little responding in the neutral context. 
 
Bouton and Bolles (1979) conducted a conditioned suppression experiment 
with rats in which subjects received excitation training with a CS in 
Context 1 and extinction training with that CS in Context 2. Interestingly, 
they found renewed excitation in an associatively neutral, third context, and 
interpreted this result to support the view that extinction is specific to the 
context in which it occurred, whereas conditioned excitation will readily 
generalize to a neutral context. This corresponds to the second mechanism 
described above (generalization from the training context to a neutral context), 
but their data are equally compatible with the view that ambiguity is 
limited to the context in which the ambiguity was created. Furthermore, in a 
recent study conducted by Gunther, Denniston, and Miller (in press), subjects 
showed generalized excitatory behavior when tested in a neutral context following 
conditioning and extinction conducted in separate contexts. The main 
goal of their study involved other issues and the aforementioned subjects 
represented a control condition used in that experiment. However, the results 
provide us with further support of Bouton and Bolles’ results. 
Subsequent data from Bouton’s laboratory favors the view that ambiguity 
is limited to the context in which the ambiguity was created. For example, 
Bouton and Brooks (1993) conducted discrimination training (i.e., T+ and 
L-) in one context (A) followed by reversal training (i.e., T- and L+) in 
another context (B). In other words, subjects received excitation training 
followed by extinction (with a context switch between phases) for one CS 
(i.e., T) and CS-preexposure followed by excitation training (with a context 
switch between phases) for another CS (i.e., L). Results showed that testing 
in Context A revealed robust conditioned suppression to T but not to L, and 
that testing in Context B revealed robust conditioned suppression to L but 
not to T, thereby suggesting that both contexts came to acquire the ability 
to modulate responding to the CSs. Behavior observed in a third, neutral 
context was more perplexing. Subjects exhibited weak conditioned responding 
to T and a modest level of responding to L; thus, it was the second 
(and most recent) context experienced that seemed to control responding to 
both T and L in the neutral context (i.e., possibility #4 from the preceding 
list). These data challenge the view that conditioned responding in a neutral 
context is determined by the context in which the CS was paired with the 
US. 
 
 
The present study sought to examine the effects of testing both X (the 
overshadowed stimulus, or target cue) and A (the overshadowing stimulus, 
or comparator cue) in a third, neutral context (P) after presenting subjects 
with overshadowing training in Context Mand extinction of the overshadowing 
cue in Context N. Let us consider what each of the four aforementioned 
views would predict with respect to responding to the overshadowed (X) 
and overshadowing (A) cues in this neutral context. First, the view stating 
behavior acquired in the context in which ambiguity arises will be specific 
to that context would predict that in the neutral context responding to both 
stimuli will be determined by the effective associative value of each stimulus 
in the first (unambiguous) context (M). Specifically, X should support little 
conditioned responding and A should support strong conditioned responding 
since, following overshadowing training, responding to the overshadowed 
stimulus is typically weak and responding to the overshadowing stimulus is 
strong. This prediction assumes that A is far more salient than X, thereby 
minimizing reciprocal overshadowing. Due to A being of high saliency and 
X being of low saliency, A presumably served as the comparator stimulus 
for X, whereas the context rather than X served as the comparator stimulus 
for A. Second, if training in the context in which the US was presented 
determines behavior in a neutral context, responding to the stimuli should 
be determined by the value of the stimuli in Context M, where training occurred. 
As in the preceding view, X should support little conditioned responding 
in Context P because it was overshadowed in the training context 
(M), while A should support vigorous conditioned responding in Context P 
concordant with that which it supports in Context M. Again, this assumes 
that reciprocal overshadowing is minimized by the use of an A stimulus that 
is much more salient than the X stimulus. Third, if behavior in a neutral 
context (P) is an average of the CS’s response eliciting potential in the two 
treatment contexts, we would expect moderate conditioned responding to X 
because X’s effective associative value is low in the training context (M) 
and high in the context in which A was extinguished (N), and modest responding 
to A because A’s effective associative value is high in the training 
context and low in the extinction context. Fourth, if there is a recency effect, 
strong responding to X and weak responding to A would be expected in 
Context P because that is what was observed in the extinction context (N) 
following extinction of A in Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
 
The subjects were 48 experimentally naive, adult male and female rats of 
Sprague-Dawley descent. The animals were bred in our colony from Holtzman 
stock (Madison, Wl). Weight ranges were 240–325 g for males and 
180–275 g for females. Each animal was assigned to 1 of 3 test conditions 
(ns = 16), counterbalanced for sex. Subjects were housed and maintained 
as described in Experiment 1. 
 
 
Apparatus 
 
The apparatus was the same as for Experiment 1, except for the addition 
of a third context (i.e., Context P). Context P was substantially different from 
Contexts M and N in that (a) subjects were placed into a different example 
of the experimental chamber, (b) a 15-W bulb (nominal at 120 VAC but 
powered at 50 VAC), flashed at a rate of .2 s on/.2 s off, and (c) each chamber 
was equipped with a Plexiglas floorplate over the grid floor. 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Details and parameters for Experiment 2 were identical to those in Experiment 
1 except where otherwise stated. Because overshadowing was clearly 
demonstrated in Experiment 1 and identical parameters were used, that group 
was not included in the present study. Contexts M and N were fully counterbalanced 
within groups. 
 
Acclimation. On Days 1–3, all animals were acclimated to Contexts M, 
N, and P, respectively. Context acclimation was conducted as in Experiment 
1. 
 
Overshadowing training. Prior to training, all lick tubes were removed 
from the chambers. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three test 
conditions (ns = 16): M, N, or P, identified by where testing with X would 
subsequently occur. All subjects received 4 daily AX1 compound trials in 
Context M on Days 4 and 7. On Days 5 and 8, all subjects received compara- 
ble exposure to Context N, and on Days 6 and 9, all subjects received comparable 
exposure to Context P. On Days 5, 6, 8, and 9, no CSs or USs were 
programmed to occur. 
 
Extinction. Prior to this phase, lick tubes were reinserted into each chamber. 
On Days 10, 13, 16, and 19, all subjects received extinction of the overshadowing 
cue (i.e., 54 A2 trials per day) in Context N. On Days 11, 14, 
17, and 20, all subjects received comparable exposure to Context M. Finally, 
on Days 12, 15, 18, and 21, all subjects received comparable exposure to 
Context P. 
 
Testing. The procedure used for testing was the same as was used in Experiment 
1. On Day 22, all subjects, which until this time had been treated 
identically, were tested on X in either Context M, N, or P. On Day 23, all 
subjects were tested on A in one of the two contexts (counterbalanced) other 
than that in which they were tested on Day 22. This was done to minimize 
the influence on Day 23 behavior of any learning that might have occurred 
during testing on Day 22. We consistently tested on X before A because 
responding to X was of greatest interest. Because A was presumably the 
comparator stimulus for X, the extinction of A that would have occurred 
during testing of A might have influenced responding to X had we tested 
on A first. Due to X being of lower salience than A, X was likely a less 
significant comparator stimulus for A than A was for X. Hence, extinction 
of X during testing of X was less apt to influence responding to A. More 
important, by testing all subjects on X first, any resultant change in responding 
to A would have occurred in all three groups because the three 
groups were treated identically until the test trials. 
 
The data from one subject tested on X in Context M was eliminated from 
all analyses due to an error made during testing, and the data from two subjects 
tested on X in Context P were eliminated due to illness prior to testing. 
 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
When testing was conducted in the overshadowing context (i.e., Context 
M), responding to X was weak (indicative of overshadowing), despite X’s 
comparator stimulus (A) having been extinguished (albeit in a different context). 
However, responding to X was robust in Context N, where A had been 
extinguished. Responding to A was also modulated by the context in which 
testing occurred. Strong conditioned responding was seen to A in Context 
M (where it had overshadowed X) and weak conditioned responding was 
seen to A in Context N (where it had been extinguished). Most interesting 
was responding in Context P (the neutral context). We observed robust conditioned 
responding to both X and A in Context P, a result not predicted by 
any of the alternative views described earlier. The following analyses confirm 
these conclusions. 
 
One-way ANOVAs (Test Context: M, N, or P) were initially conducted 
on the pre-CS times from each of Days 22 and 23. These analyses failed to 
reveal any group differences in baseline responding, Fs , 1. Therefore, we 
can conclude that there were no appreciable differences in fear to the contexts 
across groups. 
 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA (Test Context: M, N, or P) was conducted on the X 
data and revealed a main effect of Test Context, F(2, 42) = 5.93, p < .01. 
Group means are illustrated in Figure 2. Two planned comparisons were 
conducted. First, greater conditioned suppression to X was observed in Condition 
N than in Condition M, F(1, 42) = 8.35, p < .01, demonstrating 
contextual control of A’s role as a comparator stimulus (i.e., overshadowing) 
by the two contexts. Thus, a renewal effect for the comparator role of A was 
observed in Experiment 2, as it had been in Experiment 1. Second, greater 
suppression to X was detected in Condition P than in Condition M, F(1, 
42) = 9.41, p < .01, indicating decreased overshadowing in the neutral test 
context relative to the training context. Inspection of Figure 2 indicates that 
responding to X in Context P was at least as robust as that seen in Context 
N. 
 
In none of the three contexts was responding to A found to differ as a 
function of which context the prior test on X had occurred, ps > .10. Therefore, 
we pooled data across this variable. A one-way ANOVA (Test Context: 
M, N, or P) was then conducted on the A data, which revealed a main effect 
of Test Context, F(2, 42) = 9.76, p < .01 (see Figure 2). Two planned 
comparisons were then conducted. First, subjects in Condition M were found 
to exhibit more conditioned suppression than subjects in Condition N, F(1, 
42) = 17.67, p < .01. This shows that context modulated responding to A. 
Second and most interesting was that subjects in Condition P exhibited more 
conditioned responding than subjects in Condition N, F(1, 42) = 9.86, p < 
.01 indicating generalization of renewal of the associative status of A to a 
neutral context. Since the physical contexts serving as Contexts M and N 
were counterbalanced within groups, differences in responding to X or A 
could not be attributed to differences in stimulus generalization decrement 
going from Contexts M and N to Context P. In addition, one might suspect 
that prior testing with X decreased subsequent responding to A if extinction 
of X (during testing of X) generalized to A. However, this expectation 
was not supported in that responding to both X and A was vigorous in Context 
P. 
 
Although Contexts M and N were counterbalanced within groups, Context 
P was not for practical reasons. In principle, this might have influenced the 
present results. However, baseline licking on the test days was highly similar 
in all three contexts, suggesting no special fear of Context P that might have 
yielded strong suppression to X and A. Moreover, Context P was on average 
within groups equally similar to Contexts M and N because Contexts M and 
N were counterbalanced. Thus, it is unlikely that the lack of counterbalancing 
of Context P could explain the present data. 
 
Recall from the previous discussion that in three of the four alternative 
views concerning factors determining conditioned responding in a neutral 
context, responding to X and A was expected to reflect the reciprocal inequalities 
seen in either Context M or Context N, and in the fourth view (averaging), 
responding to X and A midway between that seen in Contexts M and 
N was expected. What was actually observed in Context P was very robust 
responding to both X and A. Therefore, the present results support none of 
the alternatives mentioned. Again, as in Experiment 1, very few subjects 
suppressed for the full 10 min allowed. Thus, ceiling effects could not have 
masked real differences in associative status. 
 
Given the failure of each of the four previously described predictions of 
what might occur during testing in a neutral context, one might ponder the 
strategy the animals employed in this task. In Context P, both X and A are 
ambiguous in the sense that they are known to yield different behaviors in 
the training context (M) than in the extinction context (N). In other words, 
the animal can disambiguate the two different values of X and A by using 
the training or extinction context as a discriminative stimulus. However, 
presenting the animal with either X or A in the neutral context (P) now 
creates a new level of ambiguity, one that cannot be disambiguated by the 
use of contextual cues. Here, it may be (evolutionarily) advantageous for the 
subject to adopt the strategy that involves the least risk; that is, the subject 
uses a ‘‘default strategy’’ for responding in which it responds in an excitatory 
manner to all stimuli in potentially threatening situations that can’t be disambiguated. 
 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The comparator hypothesis (Miller & Matzel, 1988; Miller & Schachtman, 
1985) predicts that behavior seen at test is determined by the US representation 
directly activated by the CS relative to the US representation indirectly 
activated by associations between the CS and its comparator stimuli, and 
between the comparator stimuli and the US. In Experiment 1, the comparator 
hypothesis would suggest that A was X’s primary comparator stimulus because 
it was consistently present during training of X and it had high predictive 
value with respect to the US (except for Group ACQ). While the 
context was also present during subjects’ experience with X, the comparator 
hypothesis maintains that A (and not the context) was the primary comparator 
stimulus for X due to A’s greater salience and superior contiguity with 
respect to the US). If the context were the primary comparator stimulus for X, 
then our deflation manipulation should not have revealed differences across 
groups in responding to X. Additionally, if the context was the primary comparator 
stimulus for X, Groups O-S, O-D, and O should each have exhibited 
high (and equivalent) responding to X in Context M as a result of each group 
having received posttraining deflation of Context M. Subjects in Group 
O-S received extinction of the comparator stimulus in the same context in 
which overshadowing training had previously occurred. These subjects 
showed recovery from overshadowing as a result of this posttraining manipulation 
(a replication of the findings of Kaufman & Bolles, 1981; Matzel et 
al., 1985). It is important to note that this recovery effect was maintained 
even when testing was conducted in an associatively neutral context (i.e., 
no CSs or USs had been presented to Group O-S in Context N prior to testing 
in that location). This is consistent with a tenant of the comparator hypothesis 
(see Kasprow et al., 1987; Miller & Matzel, 1988) that the critical comparison 
between the target CS-US association and the comparator stimulus-US 
association is made at the time of testing, but that the comparator stimuli 
are the salient cues that were present during training (not testing). Clearly, 
posttraining extinction of the comparator stimulus in Group O-S served to 
weaken the comparator stimulus-US association (and perhaps the target CS comparator 
stimulus association), thereby enhancing expression of the target 
CS-US association at test regardless of where testing occurred. 
 
However, in Experiment 1, when training and subsequent extinction of 
the overshadowing stimulus occurred in different contexts, as was the case 
for Group O-D, responding to X was strongly influenced by the test location. 
In Group O-D, subjects received overshadowing training in Context M and 
extinction of the comparator stimulus (A) in Context N. When Group O-D 
subjects from Experiment 1 and Condition M subjects from Experiment 2 
were tested for suppression to X in the overshadowing training context (M), 
weak responding (i.e., overshadowing) was observed, despite the fact that 
these subjects had received extinction of A. Apparently, a return to the original 
overshadowing training context ‘‘renewed’’ the comparator stimulus 
(A)-US association, thereby allowing it to attenuate the expression of the 
target CS (X)-US association at test in Context M such that an overshadowing 
effect was observed. However, when testing was conducted in the context 
in which extinction of the comparator stimulus had occurred (N), X elicited 
strong responding. This observation indicates that, in the context in which 
the comparator stimulus was extinguished, the effective comparator stimulus 
(A)-US association had been successfully weakened, thereby permitting expression 
of the target CS-US association at test in that context. 
 
Van Hamme and Wasserman’s (1994) model views overshadowing as an 
acquisition failure and can also account for the attenuation of the overshadowing 
deficit as a result of posttraining extinction of the overshadowing cue. 
According to their model, additional acquisition of excitatory value with respect 
to X accrues during the A2 trials. Although this explanation is able 
to account for the basic recovery effect in a more mechanistic manner than 
does the comparator hypothesis, it does not anticipate any effect of shifting 
contexts between training and the extinction of the overshadowing stimulus. 
In contrast, the comparator hypothesis anticipates that responding to a target 
CS ought be modulated by the local associative value of its comparator stimulus. 
Thus, the present data based on testing in Contexts M and N appear 
more consistent with the comparator hypothesis, with its emphasis on the 
failure to express associations that were acquired, than with the Van Hamme 
and Wasserman model, with its emphasis on the failure to acquire associations. 
 
Bouton and Swartzentruber (1986) suggested that when a CS is reinforced 
in one context and subsequently extinguished in another context, the contexts 
may be acting as positive and negative occasion setters, respectively, for the 
CS. An occasion setter is assumed to modulate responding to a discrete CS 
independently of the occasion setter’s direct association with the US (Holland, 
1983). Bouton and Swartzentruber exposed animals to reinforced presentations 
of a CS in one context, alternated with nonreinforced presentation 
of the same CS in an alternate context. Subjects quickly learned to modulate 
responding to the CS as a function of the particular context in which it was 
presented. A variety of tests were conducted to rule out the possibility that 
the contexts themselves had gained either excitatory or inhibitory strength. 
 
In the present Experiment 1, for Group O-D, Context M (the overshadowing 
training context) may have set the occasion for X to elicit behavior indicative 
of an overshadowing deficit, while Context N (the context in which 
X’s comparator stimulus had been extinguished) may have set the occasion 
for X to elicit behavior indicative of recovery from that deficit. Applying 
this reasoning to the comparator hypothesis, the overshadowing context (M) 
may have set the occasion for effective retrieval of comparator (A)-US associations 
that attenuated responding to X (i.e., overshadowing), whereas the 
comparator stimulus extinction context (N) set the occasion for nonretrieval 
of comparator stimulus (A)-US associations (or retrieval of an A-no US association), 
thereby allowing vigorous responding to X (i.e., no overshadowing). 
While the present study was not explicitly intended to examine occasion 
setting by context, the observed modulatory role of the test contexts M and 
N with respect to responding to X by Group O-D is consistent with the view 
that occasion setting by the test contexts in fact occurred. 
 
Let us now consider the results of Experiment 2. In a study of relative 
stimulus validity with rats, Cole, Barnet, and Miller (1995) found results 
similar to those of Experiment 2. After correlated relative validity training 
(i.e., AX+/BX-) in one context and extinction of the more valid cue (i.e., 
A-) in another context, all subjects were tested for responding to X in a 
third (neutral) context. Subjects demonstrated strong conditioned responding 
to X in this neutral context. According to Bouton and his colleagues, extinction 
should be context specific. Thus, the results of extinguishing A (i.e., 
attenuated responding to A and with it enhanced responding to X) should 
be specific to the context in which extinction of A occurred, and this prediction 
might be extrapolated to the anticipation of weak responding to X in a 
neutral context; however, strong responding to X was observed. It is important 
to note that Cole et al. did not conduct their study with the intention of 
looking at contextual modulation of behavior. Therefore, testing was not 
conducted with X in the relative-validity training context or in the context 
in which A was extinguished. Additionally, no tests were conducted on A. 
It would be interesting to determine if animals in that situation would show 
robust conditioned responding to A in the third context in the relative validity 
procedure, a result that would be consistent with Bouton and King (1983) as 
well as with what was observed with our present overshadowing procedure. 
 
Lovibond, Preston, and Mackintosh (1984) found a similar result using a 
latent inhibition procedure. Subjects received extensive nonreinforced exposure 
to a CS in one context prior to excitatory training with that CS in another 
context. Subjects exhibited weak conditioned responding to the CS when 
testing took place in the context where CS-preexposure had been conducted, 
and strong conditioned responding to the CS when testing took place in the 
context where conditioning had been conducted. More relevant to the issue 
at hand, they also observed robust responding to the CS when testing occurred 
in a third, neutral context. Lovibond et al.’s study was aimed at looking 
at this particular phenomenon (as opposed to the Cole et al., 1995, study), 
and as a result included proper controls (e.g., all contexts were equated for 
the values of context-US associations). 
 
Taking together the studies of Bouton (e.g., Bouton & Bolles, 1979), Lovibond 
et al. (1984), Cole et al. (1995), and the present Experiment 2 of this 
report, the following conclusion emerges: that Bouton and Bolles (1979) 
were correct in presuming that excitation generalizes more readily to a novel 
context than does extinction (or inhibition). While no contemporary model 
of associative learning or performance (including the comparator hypothesis) 
can account for this result, it is interesting in and of itself, appears to be a 
consistent finding in the literature, and begs for theoretical address. When 
contexts disambiguate the meaning of a CS, subjects use that information; 
but when contexts fail to resolve the ambiguity, the default strategy appears 
to be to respond . . . at least in aversively motivated situations. 
 
More generally, the present experiments probed the nature of various types 
of associations established during a conditioning session with multiple cues 
present. It is important to remember that although a relatively large number 
of associations (with varying degrees of effective strength) are likely acquired 
in a given session, the associations made evident at the time of testing 
will greatly depend on the contextual cues present at testing. The present 
data further support the view that context plays a distinctly important role 
in the expression of learned associations. Just as test contexts can modulate 
simple Pavlovian excitatory responding to a CS that is trained in one context 
and extinguished in an alternate context, test contexts can also modulate the 
comparator value of a stimulus that was trained (with its companion target 
CS) in one context and extinguished in a different context. Alternatively 
stated, the renewal phenomenon, which is well established for the direct CSUS 
associative strength that supports Pavlovian responding, also appears applicable 
to the associative strength of cues in their roles as comparator stimuli 
for Pavlovian CSs. 
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